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 Abstract 
 
The failure of the centralized management system and the intense over-exploitation of benthonic 
resources along the Chilean coast motivated the design and implementation of  an innovative  co-
management policy in 1999. Although its positive effects have already been recognized at biological 
and organizational level, doubts have been posed with regards to its economic sustainability.  
 
In this paper, we present a bio-economic evaluation at national level for one of the most important 
and valuable benthonic resources, the Loco ecosystem.  A dynamic simulation model is developed in 
order to compare and evaluate the effectiveness of the traditional centralized management and the co-
management system recently implemented in Chile.   
 
The results show that the amount of captures and effort devoted during the centralized management 
period were significantly underestimated due to the existence of illegal captures. On the other side, the 
results reveal that, after a fearful beginning, the values for revenues, capture and stock were larger 
than those that would have been obtained in case the former centralized system had persisted. 
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Ten million people in Latin America depend directly from fishing (Agüero, 1992), being 95% artisanal 
fisheries (FAO, 1993). Nevertheless, up to 75% of the marine resources with commercial value are 
exploited or over-exploited, leaving only 25% of the resources sub-exploited (FAO, 2004). 
 
One of the main cornerstones in the current policy agenda is to avoid marine resources extinction and 
to guarantee the sustainability of artisanal fishery communities. In recent, decades, the old centralized 
management policies are giving way to new decentralized management policies, as is the case with the 
recent management benthonic resources policy in Chile. 
  
The  Loco ( Concholepas concholepas) is the main benthonic resource exploited by the artisanal 
fishermen in Chile. Since it is a highly demanded product with high market prices, it has been subject 
to intense over-exploitation.  
  The loco regulation has been historically based on a centralized management system. This system 
turned out to be ineffective and constantly mocked by its users
1 (Stotz, 1997). Therefore, several years 
ago, the Administration adopted an innovative co-management system where small-scale fisheries and 
local authorities share responsibilities over management, assessment and enforcement of benthonic 
fishery policy. 
 
Although, the evaluation of the new system appeared to have positive impacts in the management of 
artisanal fisheries, some doubts have been posed with regards to its economic sustainability 
(SUBPESCA, 2004 and Montoya, 2006) 
 
In this paper, we present a bioeconomic evaluation at national level for one of the most important and 
valuable benthonic resources, the Loco ecosystem.   A dynamic simulation model is developed in 
order to compare and evaluate the effectiveness of the traditional centralized management and the co-





2.1. The evolution of fisheries policy 
 
After the II World War, the sea was seen as a potential source of proteins that should be exploited 
(Sanchirico y Wilen, 2002). Nevertheless, it was soon realized that unlimited and uncontrolled access 
to marine resources was not efficient from a social point of view. As a consequence, the resource 
would be prone to exhaustion (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer 1954; Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, et al, 1994; 
Conrad, 1995).  
 
The open access system together with increasing demand and technological progress resulted in 
inefficient fishing overcapacity and dramatic over-exploitation of marine resource. In this context, 
centralized management systems were adopted and evolved through different policy strategies. First 
steps worked towards the implementation of open access regulated system, where both resource 
extraction quantity and arts of fishing were regulated. This strategy gave way to restricted access 
regulated system, where the number of fishermen was also limited. Despite the positive evolution of 
centralized policy, low sustainability of these management systems was often reported (Sanchirico y 
Wilen, 2002).  
 
                                                 
1 Be a system that does not permit the control of the access to the resource, management centralized system fisheries behavior is like than 
free access management systems fisheries bahavior (Conrad, 1995). In last decades, a market approach has been promoted in fisheries policy and management.. Legal 
frameworks based on marketable fisheries property rights have reached a notable development in 
some countries (Ahmed et al, 1992; Dubbink y Vilet, 1995). Nevertheless, the implementation of this 
approach is limited in developing countries where artisanal fisheries account for a large share of total 
harvest. Fears that market could displace artisanal fisheries and trigger the survival of local 
communities has been often reported (FAO, 1996; Castilla, 1996; Parma, et al., 2001 y McGoodwin, 
2002).  
 
Opposite to traditional centralized  policy or more recent market approaches, an alternative solution 
has been proposed based on self-organized resource governance systems also known as co-
management system (Schlager y Ostrom, 1992). Under this approach, stakeholders share 
responsibilities in resource management and community participation is considered essential to 
achieve the success of the measure, (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992; Pomeroy y Berkes, 1997; Sick, 
2002). User participation encourages sustainability and helps to reconcile both the private economics 
benefits and the resource conservation for its children and community (Sick, 2002 y FAO, 1996). 
 
2.2. Co-Management in Chile 
 
In order to avoid both resource exhaustion and illegal extraction, the Chilean government tried to 
implement different management strategies such as partial and total closures, total allowed catch 
(TAC) and individual quotas (IQs) (Keene, et al., 2002). However, little success and lack of 
enforcement has been reported (Stotz, 1997). 
 
The implementation territorial use right fisheries system (TURF) in Chile constitutes a completely 
novel resource allocation model in a country with no prior experiences in co-management systems. 
Therefore, the Chilean experience has been presented as one of the most important and ambitious 
initiatives in artisanal fisheries (Villena and Chavez, 2004). 
 
The TURF system has delimited coastal areas where fishery communities participate and take 
responsibilities in the management of benthonic resources (SUBPESCA, 2000). The only way for one 
community to become part of the TURF is to develop a benthonic resource assessment in the 
requested area. Once a sustainable exploitation plan is presented, the community can request the 
administration an exclusive exploitation permit on the fishing area. 
 
Several studies have already reported a positive evaluation of this system, mainly in what concerns 
biological aspects. Important improvements, both in size and biomass of the resource, have been 
appreciated in TURF areas (Castilla and Fernández, 1998; Pizarro et al. 2001, 2002 y 2004; Universidad Católica del Norte, 20051;  and Montoya, 2006). However, others studies have posed 
substantial doubts and even indicate negative results in the economic aspect (Soto, 2002; SUBPESCA, 





3.1. Model selection 
 
Although the positive effects of the AMERB system have been recognized and confirmed at biological 
and organizational level, hardly one has managed to quantify its benefits from an economic point of 
view (SUBPESCA, 20041).  
 
In the present study, a bioeconomic evaluation of this recent co-management fishery system is 
developed at national level.  Information has been gathered in the twelve Chilean regions that 
represent more than four thousand kilometers of coast along which 400 thousand persons depend upon 
artisanal fisheries to live (FUNASUPO, 1997). At present, more than 500 handling areas are actually 
operating and the same number is already in the way to be approved.  
 
A bioeconomic model is developed in order to simulate the evolution of the ecosystem should the 
traditional centralized policy still be in place. It is assumed that the traditional centralized management 
system based on closures and quotas exerted an inoperative monitoring and enforcement, actually 
operating as a de facto free access system.  The results of the model allow us to evaluate and compare 
the effectiveness of the traditional centralized management systems and the co-management system 
recently implemented in Chile.   
 
This system may be simulated by a dynamic model  in discrete time given by equations (1)-(3) where 
Xt is the state variable that represents the biomass or existing tons of loco in period t, and Et is the 
control variable that represents the effort or diving hours devoted to catch the resource during the same 
period.  
 
() ) , ( ) ( 1 1 t t t t t E X h X f X X − + = +  
() ) , ( 2 1 t t t t E X g E E = +  
() 0 ; 0 3 E E X X t t = =    for t = 0 
() 0 4 ≥ t X    and    0 ≥ t E   Where: 
Xt  : loco biomass in period t, measured in tones. 
Et  : effort units during period t, measured in diving hours.  
f(Xt)  : Loco growth function  
h(Xt,Et) : Catch function. Representa la mortalidad causada por la actividad pesquera.  
g(Xt,Et) : Normalized benefits in fisheries activities. 
 
The state equation in (1) represents the dynamic behavior of the resource and predicts the evolution of 
the stock through time. Thus, the quantity of resource in the following period are determined taking 
into account the resource stock available in the previous period plus the stock growth function. Since 
the resource is exposed to the fishing activity, the individuals captured by the fishermen, given by 
h(Xt,Et), are then deducted. 
 
It is assumed that biological population growth follows a logistic functional form as illustrated in 
equation (5), where r > 0 refers to the intrinsic rate of population growth and k > 0 is kown as the 
carrying capacity of the system. The logistic growth function has been widely used in fisheries 
evaluation studies (Seijo et al., 1997) 
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Loco resource capture within a given period is assumed to depend on available stock and effort 
according to a Cobb Douglas function as in (6) which enables to test decreasing, constant or increasing 
returns to scale.  
( )
γ β α t t t E X X h = ) ( 6  
Equation (2) represents fisherman behavior in a free access situation, assuming inoperative monitoring 
and enforcement of centralized regulation. Following a similar approach to Smith (1969) and Bjørndal 
and Conrad (1987), this equation states that changes in effort devoted to the loco capture depend on 
the benefit obtained in the previous period, g(Xt,Et). This is, an increase in net benefits will translate in 
greater effort devoted to capture within the next period. 
 
Normalized benefit g(Xt,Et) is defined in (7) as the ratio between  net income and the effort cost, 
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In general, it is assumed that the extra effort is produced by the entry of new agents, rather than by 
changes in effort of existing agents (Anderson, 1986). In the same way, it is assumed that changes in 
effort take place as an immediate response to changes in the benefits (Gordon, 1954). 3.2. Estimation of model parameters and coefficients 
 
Few works have attempted to characterize the biological parameters of the loco population.  One of 
these is González et al.  (2005), who determined the value of the intrinsic rate of growth, r.  On the 
other hand and taking into account estimations carried out by Stotz and Pérez (1992) and González et 
al.  (2005), the carrying capacity was calculated at national level.   
 
A multiple linearized regression analyses on cross-section data was carried out in order to estimate the 
unknown parameters in equation (6). Since there were no time series available, information was 
gathered at national and regional level on loco captures, stock and effort for the 1996 period (Ecofish, 
1998; IFOP, 1994, 1996, 1999 y 2003). The regression results are reported below:  
() t t t E X Y ln 718 , 0 ln 492 , 0 0057 , 0 ln ln 8 + + =   R
2 = 0,942 and n=12 
                                        (-5,927)       (3,996)           (2,257) 
The model was fitted by the usual least squares procedure. Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics 
and show that each regression coefficient is statistically significant.  The coefficients show the correct 
sign and reveal increasing return to scale. The model R
2 of 0,942 is relatively high and there was no 
evidence of auto-correlation. 
 
Finally, personal interviews were carried out to characterize artisanal fisheries and gather information 
on extraction and effort costs. Data on resource price was obtained through official fiseheries statistics 
(IFOP).  
 
Table1: Biological parameter value 
Parameter  Description  Value  Source 
p  Price per resource unit (U$ per ton)  3.358,08  Ecofish, 1998; IFOP, 1994, 1996, 
1999 y 2003 
c  Cost per diving effort unit (U$ per 
diving hours) 
50,24  Personal interviews 
r  Rate of Population Growth  0,0068  González et al. (2005) 
k  Carrying Capacity (resource ton)  8.531.738  Stotz and Pérez (1992) and 






 Table 2: Coefficient Value 
Coefficient  Description  Value  Source 
α  Independent Coefficient  0,0057  Own elaboration 
β  Dependent Coefficient of X  0,492  Own elaboration 
γ  Dependent Coefficient of E  0,718  Own elaboration 
 
 
4. Discussion of results 
 
The dynamic model simulates fishermen behaviour and the evolution of the loco ecosystem under the 
traditional centralized management policy. As explained before, it is assumed that policy enforcement 
is ineffective and, thus, fishermen operate under a de facto free access situation.  Model results are 
analyzed and compared with reported official data for two different periods: the first period between 
1996 and 1997 corresponds to closure and quota systems under the traditional centralized approach, 
while in the second period from year 2000 on, a TURF or co-management approach progressively 
replaced the old policy. 
 
Model results obtained for the first period 1996-1999 are illustrated in table 1 and a comparison of 
official and model catch values is plotted in figure 2. The white area in figure 2 shows that according 
to official data annual catches amount to around  2000 tons per year. However, catch levels obtained 
through the simulation model, depicted in the grey area, were significantly larger than the official 
catch data through the whole period 1996-1999.  
 
This significant difference may confirm that total fishing catch is underestimated and gives a picture 
of the potential importance of illegal fishing activities, as has been reported by several authors (Keene, 
et al., 2002 ; Stotz, 1997). The IFOP (1999) recognizes that actual catches and effort could be higher 
than reported official values, due to illegal fishing activities. Montoya (2006) estimates that illegal 
fishing may represent more than 50% of allowed catches in 1996.  
Figure 2: Comparison between the official catches values and free access simulation catches values 
obtained during centralized management period. 
 
However and according to simulation values, it has to be noted that catch rates decelerates from 1998 
on. Simulation results in Table 1 show that in the beginning of the period, artisanal fisheries profit 
rises as catch level increases. However, as fishermen increase their catch over the natural population 
growth level, a lower resource biomass can be expected. Smaller resource biomass forces them to 
increase the effort and time devoted to loco search and catch. As a consequence increasing cost, 
diminishing net income and lower incentives for illegal fishing may explain the deceleration of the 
catch rate. 
 
Table 3: Stock, effort and profit under open access simulation values between 1996 and 1999. 
Year  Variable 
1996  1997  1998  1999 
Catches (ton)  3.0902  5.884 8.402 8.785
Stock (ton)  32.1631  29.291 23.606  15.364
Effort (hrs)  130.571 206.522 393.273  561.605
Profit (US$)  3.815.7922  9.382.396 8.456.996  1.284.310
Source: Own elaboration 
1. Corresponds to official values (X0,). Values determined through field work by Ecofish (1998) and 
IFOP (1999). 
2. Corresponds to 150% of official values (Y0, y E0). Values determined through field work by Ecofish 
(1998) e IFOP (1999). 
 
In 1999, the resource stock reaches an historical minimum and the administration decided to 












10.000  Catches (ton) 
Yearthe policy model due to the ineffectiveness of centralized system and starts the implementation of the 
co-management system.    
 
Model results obtained for the second period 2000-2006 are illustrated in table 2 and a comparison of 
official and model catch values is plotted in figure 3. Official data in this period correspond to the 
implementation of the co-management system. During this time a biological recovery of the resource 
has been observed (Pizarro, et al., 2002 y 2004; Chávez y Soto, 2002). Thus, it is assumed quotas have 
been respected and that illegal fishing does not occur so often.   
 
At present, the resource can only be extracted in those areas explicitly requested by the fishermen. 
During the first years of operation the TURF areas did not surpass the hundred but soon reached 
almost 400. That explains the increasing trend in official catch values for this period, as it may be 
appreciated in the figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison between the official catches values and free access simulation catches values 
obtained during co-management period. 
 
Model  results  in table 2 illustrate what would have occurred if the traditional system would have not 
been replaced and allow to evaluate the potential gains of the co-management approach. Under this 
hypothetical scenario, profit turns negative due to severe resource depletion . Finally, the results 
forecast the resource extinction if the open access system had persisted. Decreasing profits would 
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Catches (ton) Table 4: Stock, effort and profit open access simulation values between 2000 and 2004. 
Year  Variable 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Catches (ton)  6.022  706 5 0.03  ** 
Stock (ton)  6.683  707 5 0.03  ** 
Effort (hrs)  587.169  402.518 47.238 321  2
Profit (US$)  -9.276.872  -17.849.264 -2.357.083 -16.027  -109
Source: Own elaboration 
** : Resource extinction.    
 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted from figure 3 that the initial implementation of the co-management 
approach translated into lower catches, and lower profits, than those attained under the hypothetical 
persistence of the ineffective centralized policy. This initial cost may justify the substantial doubts that 
have been posed on the economic gains of the new approach. However, our results also reveal that this 
initial cost is largely compensated through a longer term economic sustainability. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The replacement of the closure and quota system under a traditional centralized policy and the 
implementation of a co-management approach is regarded as one of the most important and ambitious 
initiatives in artisanal fisheries.   
 
A key element in this recent policy approach is that small-scale fisheries and local authorities share 
responsibilities over management, assessment and enforcement of benthonic fishery policy. Although 
the positive effects of this system have already been recognized and confirmed at biological and 
organizational level, substantial doubts have been risen with regard to its economic sustainability. 
 
A dynamic simulation model is developed in order to compare and evaluate the effectiveness of the 
traditional centralized management and the co-management system recently implemented in Chile.   
 
The results show that the amount of captures and effort devoted during the centralized management 
period were significantly underestimated due to the existence of illegal captures.  
 
This same behaviour would probably have continued if the ineffective traditional policy had persisted 
and illegal fisheries would have leaded the resource to extinction. On the other side, the results reveal that, after a fearful beginning, the values for revenues, capture and 
stock were larger than those that would have been obtained in case the former centralized system had 
persisted. 
 
In summary, even if the new co-management system has implied a cost in its initial phase, it has 
avoided the resource collapse in the short term, and guarantees larger biological and economic gains in 
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